Die Strategiemanufaktur – The Strategy Architects and Cat Tully are currently conducting a UK-German comparison on international strategy and the future of diplomatic services in the 21st century.
Therefore the DSM-Interview today is with Cat Tully, an independent consultant working on foreign and development policy issues (e.g. UK Houses of Parliaments). She was formerly Strategy Project Director at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office until August 2010. She has worked on strategy development across the private, government and civil society sectors, including for HMG Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit, Procter and Gamble, Christian Aid, World Bank and the UN.
DSM: Cat, you have worked in the strategy Units in the Cabinet office as well as in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. What would you consider as the strategic challenges of the diplomatic services today and tomorrow?
C.I.Tully: The three Ds of international policy – diplomacy, development and defence – are tools that governments of all nations use to promote their national interest, namely security, prosperity and wellbeing, in the international sphere. These international objectives have remained pretty constant over time. However, the challenges faced by governments in promoting these objectives have not remained constant. The nature of the world is different in 2011 than in 1911 or 1961 – more interdependent, more populous, more developed, more multipolar, more environmentally stressed. Threats and opportunities have changed, are more diffuse, complex, and they require different responses working with different non-state as well as sta-te actors. At the same time, internally within government, there is an greater need for coherence and joining-up as increasing numbers of departmental and non-government actors become involved in the international sphere.
The capacity of governments to promote their national interest at an international level has become constrained in a world of increasing multipolarity and interconnected complex global systems. Governments face an ever more challenging strategic context and a greater task to coordinate action given the increasingly blurred line between domestic and foreign policy. Moreover, the financial crisis adds further pressure to the need to prioritise national interests and invest efficiently in the right capabilities.
The key strategic challenge facing diplomatic services is therefore ensuring it remains a lead player in a very different context. The diplomatic service needs to be at the forefront of government thinking on how to respond to these challenges. Although foreign ministries are no longer the gatekeepers of international communications across governments, they could play a critical role in leading the strategic overview of their government’s international enga-gement. This is one of the key messages in the US 2011 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review: ‘21st Century Statescraft‘. The traditional purpose and objective of diplomatic services – that of influencing – stays the same. But the Why, the What, the Who and the How are now all very different.
On a more normative level, Carne Ross from Independent Diplomat, has identified a ‘diplomatic deficit’ in the current international system, whereby groups are excluded or unable to represent their interests in international institutions. The international system makes decisions that impact the lives of people who effectively have no say (including stateless people, nations-states without the diplomatic capacity/infrastructure to promote their interests in complex international negotiations, etc). In an increasingly connected world, this deficit will become increasingly evident and need to be addressed.
DSM: Do you think traditional national diplomatic services, as they were, are facing severe threats e.g. within government from other departments and outside government from the new European External Action Service (EEAS)?
C.I.Tully: I would not term it as a ‘threat’, per se. It is certainly a change in the strategic context which requires a corresponding shift from the traditional national diplomatic services. The mission of diplomatic services is to influence others. What this means in the 21st centu-ry has to be different to what it meant even ten years ago, given the new means (social net-working, 24/7 communication) and actors (types of interest groups, public diplomacy) and issues (cyber security, rare minerals, climate change, human security) involved. What I do see as a direct threat, however, is the increasing costs of maintaining a comprehensive net-work of embassies abroad: especially the cost of security and staff.
In relation to your question about the challenge posed by the involvement of domestic de-partments and EEAS. A greater international role for domestic departments (e.g. energy, climate change, justice) has resulted in what Anne-Marie Slaughter calls ‘technocratic government networks’. Their presence makes the business of influence more complex, but their expertise is key to addressing many of the world’s complex challenges. Similarly, in a world of constrained budgets, it makes sense for the EU member-states to project their collective power through a joint diplomatic service (if the interface is managed well).
These are opportunities. The diplomatic service therefore needs to change to remain relevant to the changing ways in which countries promote their national interest – and put in place flexible capabilities, structures and people to do so. To manage this change in practice is a real challenge and may require fundamental reform. The biggest threat to traditional diplomatic services is that their leaders won’t be able to promote internal change sufficiently quickly and flexibly to fit these new realities.
The UK’s FCO has done an excellent job in changing the service in various ways:
first, integrating public diplomacy into their work, including a strong campaigning approach.
Second, flexing the network of embassies, to ensure that staff are placed according to the UK’s strategic interest. Third, increasing the number of locally employed staff and integrating a growing number of domestic department employees into their embassies. Fourth, professionalising consular service delivery and backoffice operations. Fifth, exploring innovative approaches to providing laptop diplomats, regional offices, etc and in the end communicating the purpose of the FCO to domestic departments. These are some of the ways that the UK diplomatic service has been modernised over the past few years.
There are areas where more change is needed, however: for example continual progress and innovation is needed in delivering diplomatic services effectively and efficiently, along the lines described above. Also necessary is a more strategic thinking about UK’s national interests, the nature of the world and the diffuse network of actors, including how to engage on social media, doing effective horizon-scanning and risk management and then working across government to lead ‘multidisciplinary’ strategic responses to these different internatio-nal challenges and opportunities.
DSM: The former Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau said as early as in the 1970ies that the subscription of the New York Times newspaper would replace his complete foreign office. What you think there is still an essence of the diplomatic services – capabilities and capacities – nobody else can provide?
C.I.Tully: Foreign Ministries are sui generis in that they provide a package of services that collectively is unique. However, when you break them down into different functions (and functional anal-ysis is an analytical tool significantly underused in both foreign and defence policy), then you can get deeper into the question of who should/could provide the services. For example, you could say that Foreign Ministries provide the following functions to a greater or lesser degree:
1. Collecting and reporting information from foreign countries back to the centre, including risk assessment, and economic and political developments.
2. Acting as their government’s representative abroad, both in communicating and delivering the cross-government policy in-country (across the full range of interests, including development, migration, counter-terrorism, consular, and public service delivery to diaspora), as well as receiving messages from and building ongoing relationships with the host country.
3. Lead their countries’ international negotiations, both bilaterally and in multilateral organisations.
4. Holding the strategic overview of the government’s interests in a particular country, region, theme and their relative importance, trade-offs and use of different government levers.
Newspaper services could only ever begin to deliver the first function, and that arguably less effectively than a Foreign Ministry due to confidentiality and access issues. There are other groups, like political risk/advisory consultancies and public affairs companies, that provide some of the second function. Independent Diplomat is a private diplomatic organisation that provides the third function for would-be or small states that need greater negotiating capability at international fora.
My perspective is that the resources that Foreign Ministries have, namely a network of embassies and a pool of experts in international negotiations and relationship management, mean that they remain valuable institutions. However, it is important not to see Foreign Ministries from an exceptionalist perspective but instead compare current performance to other providers who can deliver similar functions (including EEAS). This in turn may provide ideas on how to prioritise, outsource where appropriate, cut costs, and innovate. As way of a foot-note to this point, see the CNAS’ report on ‘Managing 21st-Century Diplomacy: Lessons from Global Corporations‘.
DSM: Do you think the traditional structures and career-patterns will guarantee these “diplomatic USP” any longer? Could you describe some areas which should be improved?
C.I.Tully: The traditional structures and career patterns to a certain extent suit the first three functions outlined, that I group together as being the international implementation arm of government. The fourth function is around setting the strategic vision for government’s international policy. Arguably, it is in this area that most change is needed.
Overall, the diplomatic service needs more secondments across government and into/from the private and not-for-profit sector. Also needed are stronger professional skills around comunication, project management, corporate services, strategy-making, analysis and engaging with new actors. Bringing these skills into the diplomatic service will make it more permeable, less exclusive and more integrated into the rest of society.
DSM: In the current debates one can find all sorts of headlines describing the purpose, ways and means on the future of diplomacy like public diplomacy, soft power, smart power, etc. Do you have favourite model and how would you describe it?
C.I.Tully: All these concepts are useful, in particular smart power, ‘how to combine hard and soft power into the same strategy’ as Joseph Nye defines it. Concepts like national security or human security also have their place in broadening our understanding of the complex and interlocking nature of the problems we are dealing with. The problem is that these terms then get used differently by different people, leading to confusion (e.g. economic incentives are commonly incorrectly defined as soft power). Any particular lens also tends to focus on one set of solutions rather than the full range (e.g. the term ‘national security’ can mean that non-security international policy tools, like education policy or support for civil society, are over-looked). I find that it is often easier to get back to a clear statement in plain language of what the challenges are and proposed responses.A model that I do think is important is the systems approach, namely to see the nation-state as only one of a network or landscape of actors.
DSM: How important is leadership?
C.I.Tully: Very important on three levels. First, as discussed, the leaders of the diplomatic services will need to show strong leadership in setting a reform agenda and defining the USP of the foreign ministry in a 21st century world. Second, the work of diplomacy is about influence, which is about thought leadership, with a strong bias to soft power in being able to set the agenda. This is about having the reputation, understanding and expertise, being perceived to be an honest broker. Third, Ambassadors and policy leaders in the centre show leadership in holding the strategic overview of cross-governmental interests in their area.
DSM: Strategic and sustainable architectures are based generally on strategy, innovation and networking, I would like to finish our short interview with the following questions to you. Which three elements would make diplomats and foreign offices more strategic?
C.I.Tully: To recap on my earlier answers, the following changes would make Foreign Ministries more strategic:
First, being more permeable to outsiders from other government departments, the private/not-for-profit sectors and academic/thinktankers.
Second, embedding strategic thinking throughout the organisation, ensuring that units have the time to use strategic thinking in their policy development, whilst ensuring that there is a unit at the centre that can challenge groupthink, can identify trade-offs between policy areas, and can identify issues coming up on the horizon.
Third, enhancing analytical capability on historical analysis, systems-thinking, and horizon-scanning/futures work, and ensuring that it informs thinking on international issues across all departments, not just the Foreign Ministry (e.g. FCO Research Analysts’s work)
But the answer to the question is not just about the diplomatic service and Foreign Ministries, it is also about the wider government machinery. Many governments have responsed with internal machinery of government changes to address the new global challenges and to address internal coordination and information problems. These responses include developing written national security documents, rearranging internal structures and creating new units (like horizon-scanning or strategy units). For example, France established various new committees and clarified inter-ministerial relationships in the 2008 French White Paper on Defence and National Security, and the UK established a National Security Council under the 2010 Conservative-Liberal coalition government. This year’s US QDDR looks at the capabilities needed by 21st century diplo-matic and development services. The German government has conducted various conferences on what a 21st century foreign policy should look like. These experi-ences make for a valuable source of knowledge and learning about good practice.
Up until now, however, there has been a shortage of policy-focused research on this issue using a structured cross-country comparative approach. The analysis that we are conducting will mine different countries’ experiences to date by mapping their responses and comparing them to gain insights into good practice and innovation. As well as understanding the range of different policy responses, we aim to understand what works in terms of political leadership of effective and long-lasting institutional change in how governments develop and implement international policy.
DSM: What are the conditions of an open and innovative diplomatic service culture? For example, do you think one could establish a sort of open innovation process with stakeholders on equal and collaborative terms?
C.I. Tully: I’m glad that you raise this question, because I haven’t yet talked directly about the impact of technology, web 2.0 and 24/7 media on foreign policy. It has sharply accelerated the trend of democratisation of foreign policy, which in the UK goes back to the early twentieth century domestic public reaction to tactics in the Boer war. Diplomatic engagement, previously an elite-to-elite activity, is increasingly and unavoidably a more open activity. Here are some interesting implications to this phenomenon:
First, polling indicates that foreign policy issues are increasingly higher on the priority list of national citizens, requiring political leaders to discuss and explain policy decisions to a domes-tic audience.
Second, in constrained financial circumstances and in a multipolar world, it is important to have a public dialogue on what the national interest is, what the national strategy(ies) should be, and where resources should be allocated. An excellent example of this is the process the French used in developing their 2008 Defence and Security White papers. A consultative approach with a wider audience outside government resulted in a major strategic shift (joining NATO).
Third, the permeability of e-communication systems means that private diplomatic conversations will be more difficult (epitomised by Wikileaks, although the general assessment was that there was little that couldn’t be picked up from open source material). Together with the ac-tivity of social networks, sharing of information and citizen-generated content, it means that foreign policy is increasingly held to account by citizens here and abroad. Inconsistencies, differences between private and public conversations, and put-of-date heuristics will be in-creasingly exposed. It will be difficult to say one thing and act in another way. What we do in Libya does have a knock on effect on discussions about our policy vis a vis Bahrain.
Although there are risks to this general trend, I believe that the drive to greater transparency accountability, and participation is a positive development on the whole. Yes, some delicate conversations need to be private; yes, sometimes pragmatic negotiations require cover; yes, effective decision-making sometimes demands subject expertise that we don’t all possess. However, my sense is that wider participation will result in more coherent, innovative and strategic foreign policy precisely because it opens up the decision-making process to a negotiated outcome made up of different perspectives. (Canada’s forward thinking foreign policy, including its position on WWII, South Africa, public diplomacy, natural resources, etc) is ar-guably due to its open discussions given a fragmented political elite.) In addition, greater participation has the advantage of potentially unlocking citizen capacity and resources (for example diaspora links, expertise, business links, etc).
One of the key roles of the diplomatic service is therfore about setting the framework for enabling other actors in society to contribute and shape decisions and implementation, rather than a command and control approach. This is a collorary of the trend in domestic policy of seeing the state as an enabler rather than an implementer.
One interesting question is then how to promote meaningful citizen engagement on international policy without it descending into a superficial voting process (see discussions in the UK about the Conservative MyAid proposal which proposes that citizens vote for their preferred development projects). What does real participation look like? There are organisations like Involve in the UK that are experts in the field of ctizen engagement, but who tend to look at domestic policy issues since there is limited demand from government to examine what public engagement on foreign policy could look like. I would like to see diplomatic services work with these organisations to explore these issues further. See Canada25′s work for one example of what this looks like.
DSM: What would characterize a target-orientated diplomatic networking within a department and concerning external partners?
C.I.Tully: At a macro-level, an agreed regular foreign-ministry-led process for setting the national inter-national strategic vision should occur, similar to the US’ new QDDR process. This could be arranged to coincide with a new government term and any Defence Reviews. On a more operational level, the Foreign Ministry and other Departments should develop a clearly de-fined process and methodology for developing thematic and country strategies and coordinating Departmental business planning processes. Organisational innovations (like bringing together the Strategy Units or Policy Units across the different Departments) could also be explored. Joint training and secondments would also be valuable as would a forum for different Departments’ senior leaders/policy Director Generals to meet and discuss common is-sues and align strategic vision.
If you are interested in finding out more about the project, please contact Cat Tully (cat@fromoverhere.co.uk) and Oliver Will (will@strategiemanufaktur.de)